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PROBABILITY OF CAUSATION IN RADIATION
TORT LITIGATION
There is found in the Summer a kind of spider called a Tainct, of a red
colour, and so little of body that ten of the largest will hardly outway a
graine; this by Country people is accounted a deadly poyson unto
cowes and horses, who, if they suddenly dye, and swell thereon, ascribe
their death hereto, and will commonly say, they have licked a Tainct.
Now to satisfie the doubts of men, we have called this tradition unto
experiment; we have given hereof unto dogs, chickens, calves and hor-
ses, and not in the singular number, yet never could finde the least
disturbance ensue. There must be therefore other causes enquired of
the sudden death, and swelling of cattell, and perhaps this insect is
mistaken, and unjustly accused for some other... Now although the
animall may be mistaken and the opinion also false, yet in the ground
and reason which makes men most to doubt the verity hereof there
may be truth enough, that is the inconsiderable quantity of this insect.
For that a poyson cannot destroy in so small a bulke, we have no rea-
son to affirme.
Sir Thomas Browne, Pseudodoxia Epidemica*
I. INTRODUCTION
Radiation' can "cause' cancer; radiation can "cure" cancer. Radi-
ologists2 are confronted with this tragic irony every time they prescribe a
course of radiotherapy,3 or radiation cancer therapy. The benefit to be
achieved by radiotherapy is the death of cancer cells; the cost to be
* I SIR THOMAS BROWNE'S PSEUDODOXIA EPIDEMICA 282-83 (R. Robbins ed. 1981) (lst
ed. 1646).
1. The term "radiation" includes ionizing and non-ionizing radiation. The term as used in
this paper refers only to ionizing radiation or "radiation of either a particulate-or a wavelike charac-
ter that removes charges from, or adds them to, electrically neutral atoms and molecules.. ." Beebe,
Ionizing Radiation and Health, 70 AM. ScIENTIST 35 (1982).
2. A radiologist is "[o]ne skilled in the diagnostic and/or therapeutic use of x-rays and other
forms of radiant energy." STEDMAN'S MEmDICAL DICTIONARY 1188 (5th unabr. lawyer's ed. 1982).
3. Radiotherapy is the "medical specialty which relates to the use of electromagnetic or partic-
ulate radiations in the treatment of disease." Id. The medical treatment of cancer utilizes several
forms of radiation: x-radiation, fast neutrons, protons, negative pi-mesons, helium ions and heavy
ions. E.J. HALL, RADIOBIOLOGY FOR THE RADIOLOGIST 319-20 (2d ed. 1979).
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weighed, the death or carcinogenesis 4 of surrounding normal cells. Ex-
posure to radiation is intrinsically valueless; its value or harm is depen-
dent on which cell it "hits" and how it "hits" it.' The radiologist,
therefore, must weigh the radiation risk of the neoplastic transformation6
of healthy cells against the successful diagnosis and treatment of cancer,
maximizing radiation's curative effect, minimizing its destructive impact.
Society weighs the risks and benefits of other uses of radiation. The
viability of nuclear energy as a source of energy rises or falls with the
public's perception of the risks and benefits of its production. Nuclear
weapons proliferate with society's fear of hostile attack rather than self-
destruction. The disposal of nuclear waste threatens or abates depending
on whose backyard becomes a waste disposal site. The uses of radioac-
tive substances are diverse and pervasive-from nuclear weapons and nu-
clear energy7  to diagnostic and therapeutic medicine8  to scientific
4. Carcinogenic is defined as "causing cancer." STEADMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 223
(5th unabr. lawyer's ed. 1982). Cancer is a "general term frequently used to indicate any of various
types of malignant neoplasms, most of which invade surrounding tissues, may metastasize to several
sites, and are likely to recur after attempted removal and to cause death of the patient unless ade-
quately treated .. " Id. at 216.
5. There are two primary models of the inactivation of molecules in a cell by ionizing radia-
tion: the target theory and the diffusion theory. The target theory posits that the radiation directly
damages or kills the cell by producing ionizations of the DNA (deoxyribonucleic acids). The diffu-
sion theory addresses the likelihood of the interaction with molecules of water in the cell, as the cell
is eighty percent water. According to the diffusion theory, radiation indirectly acts on the DNA of
the cell through the formation of highly reactive free radicals H and OH from water. Hutchinson,
Molecular Basis for Action of Ionizing Radiations, 134 SCIENCE 533 (1961). See E.J. HALL, supra
note 3, at 10-12.
If the radiation "hits" the cell either through direct or indirect action, several possible effects
occur: 1) the subeellular damage may be repaired by the cell, 2) the hit(s) could kill the cell, or 3) the
damage could result in the carcinogenesis, or neoplastic transformation of the cell. Han, Hill and
Elkind, Repair of Cell Killing and Neoplastic Transformation at Reduced Dose Rates of
6"Co y-Rays, 40 CANCER RES. 3328 (1980).
6. Neoplasm is defined as:
an abnormal tissue that grows by cellular proliferation more rapidly than normal and con-
tinues to grow after the stimuli that initiated the new growth cease. [Neoplasms] show
partial or complete lack of structural organization and functional coordination with the
normal tissue, and usually form a distinct mass of tissue which may be either benign (be-
nign tumor) or malignant (carcinoma).
STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 931 (5th unabr. lawyer's ed. 1982).
7. UNITED NATIONS SCIENTIFIC COMMIITEE ON THE EFFECTS OF ATOMIC RADIATION,
SOURCES AND EFFECTS OF IONIZING RADIATION at 13-15, U.N. Doc. A/32/40, U.N. Sales No.
E.77.IX.1 (1977) [hereinafter UNSCEAR].
8. Id. at 15-16. X-ray examinations are perhaps the most common source of non-natural radi-
ation exposure. Though once used less discriminately as a diagnostic tool, x-ray examinations are
kept at the minimum required for medical use. Id. at 17. "Among diagnostic procedures, the aver-
age dose absorbed by the bone marrow varies from about 0.01 rad for a chest x-ray to 0.90 rad for a
barium enema .. " Beebe, supra note 1, at 35. High energy irradiation of cancer tumors through
the use of linear accelerators and cobalt-60 units is the major source for radiation cancer therapy. H.
JOHNS & J. CUNNINGHAM, THE PHYSICS OF RADIOLOGY 130 (4th ed. 1983).
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research, food irradiation, and even smoke alarms and antistatic devices.9
The efficacy of each use must be measured by the balancing of defined
costs and benefits. How the scales tip depends on how the relevant fac-
tors are weighed and measured.
In balancing radiation costs and benefits to society, the cost of injury
must be recognized and redressed. Cells comprise individuals; individu-
als, society. Radiation injury to a healthy cell can give rise to a cancer
which can destroy the individual. As one of the roles of medicine is to
avoid or remedy such an injury to the body, one of the roles of tort law is
to prevent or redress possible harm to individual members of society in-
curred in pursuit of societal goals. Tort law defines and evaluates the
costs of various societal aims by recognizing such harms as legally cogni-
zable injuries, compensating the injured from the coffers of the tortfeasor.
Such compensation deters the conduct which produces the harm if the
costs outweigh the benefits, or spreads the costs among the beneficiaries if
the benefits outweigh the costs. This system, however, often fails in radi-
ation tort actions, not because the injury, cancer, is not legally cogniza-
ble, but because under traditional tort law the plaintiff is unable to show
that radiation has "caused" the cancer.10 The costs, therefore, are not
fully counted in the cost/benefit analysis of radiation use.
The nemesis of legal redress is cause-in-fact, an unlikely source for
what in essence acts as a determination of liability based on policy. In
any tort the plaintiff must prove that the defendant's act or omission was
a "necessary antecedent" or cause-in-fact of the injury. 1' Unlike the pol-
icy-laden concept of proximate cause, 2 cause-in-fact is assumed to be a
neutral concept.1" But in effect, it is cause-in-fact that precludes recovery
from many radiation tort plaintiffs. Determining that radiation exposure
caused any individual cancer is impossible. a What can be scientifically
9. UNSCEAR, supra note 7, at 13.
10. See generally Note, Tort Actions For Cancer Deterrence, Compensation, and Environmental
Carcinogenesis, 90 YALE L.J. 840, 846-47 (1981) (discussing the failure of tort law's role of compen-
sation in cancer torts).
11. W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 42, at 272-73 (5th ed.
1984).
12. Id. § 41, at 265.
13. Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U.
Cat. L. REv. 69, 71 (1975).
14. Biological effects of radiation are divided into two categories according to the dose received:
chronic, or low dose effects, and acute, or extremely high dose effects. This paper is concerned only
with cancer, a chronic effect which is probabilistic in its occurrence due to its subeellular damage.
Legal causation problems do not occur with acute radiation injury. The doses are so high that the
effects are fatal, immediate, and apparant at the tissue and organ level.
[Tihere are several dose-dependent syndromes that cause fairly rapid mortality. At acute
1989]
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determined through the use of epidemiological studies is an excess risk of
cancer in populations exposed to radiation. Though such evidence is per-
suasive scientific evidence, it does not meet the requisite "but-for" or
"substantial factor" tests of legal cause-in-fact.15 Consequently, the radi-
ation tort plaintiff is without compensation, and the defendant is without
cost. Tort objectives of compensation to injured plaintiffs and deterrence
of defendants' conduct are left unrealized. The essential element of in-
jury costs is subtracted from the balancing equation that weighs the costs
and benefits of the use of radiation.
The injustice and inequity of this effective bar to legal redress for
injury will be examined through the following paradigm:
Dena Smith, a forty-one-year-old mother of two, has lived all her
life in Grand Junction, Colorado. Grand Junction is a beautiful town in
western Colorado that supported the industries of uranium mining and
milling that flourished after the development of the atomic bomb. When
Dena was a child, most of the Grand Junction community was in some
way associated with the uranium industry. Few if any of the residents
believed that there was any risk associated with the radioactive uranium
mill tailings that were removed from the mill site and used in construc-
tion of buildings and houses throughout Grand Junction. 16 Dena lived in
such a house from the ages of ten to twenty-one.
Dena has been diagnosed as having lung cancer. She is a former
smoker. She is aware of the increased risk of lung cancer due to exposure
to radon, a radioactive gas produced from the radioactive disintegration
of radium and uranium in the mill tailings. 7 In fact, due to a govern-
mental clean-up program, the Uranium Mill Tailings Remedial Action
whole body doses of around 300 to 600 rad, mammals will encounter the hematopoetic
syndrome and likely perish within 2 to 4 weeks because of certain blood changes which
reduce the body's ability to fight bacterial infections. At doses of around 1000 rad or
greater the GI tract becomes ulcerated, and the loss of fluids, electrolytes, and infection
generally cause mortality within 1 week or less. Very high doses, say tens of kilorads,
cause the hematopoetic and GI syndromes, but these do not have time to develop because
mortality occurs too rapidly (< 1 day) owing to central nervous system (CNS) damage.
2 F.W. WHICKER & V. SHULTZ, RADIOECOLOGY: NUCLEAR ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT
125 (1982). See also E.J. HALL, supra note 3, at 205-15.
15. W. KEETON, supra note 11, § 41, at 265-68.
16. U. S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, I REMEDIAL AcTIONS AT THE FORMER CLIMAX URANIUM
COMPANY URANIUM MILL SITE GRAND JUNCTION, MESA COUNTY, COLORADO: FINAL ENVI-
RONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 1 (DOE/EIS-0126F, December 1986).
17. Radon-222 is a progeny radionuclide of uranium-238. After uranium ore is mined, a ura-
nium mill extracts uranium oxide from the raw ore so that it can ultimately be used as fuel in nuclear
reactors and as the fissionable material necessary in nuclear weapons. The residues of the uranium
milling process, called tailings, contain large quantities of radionuclides from the radioactive decay
of uranium-238. Because of its gaseous state, Radon-222 is the source of the greatest health risk
[Vol. 24:479
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Program (UMTRAP),1 8 she has been informed that the radon levels in
her former house were measured at 0.065 Working Levels (WL).' 9 Dena
is convinced that her lung cancer has been caused by her exposure to
radon gas for eleven years. She therefore brings an action in tort against
the uranium mill.
Under traditional tort law, Dena would be precluded from recovery.
She is unable to prove that "but-for" her exposure to radon she would
not have developed lung cancer. She is unable to show that radiation
exposure was "a material element and substantial factor"20 in bringing
about her lung cancer. What Dena can prove through epidemiological
evidence is the probability that her exposure to radon gas caused her lung
cancer.
The perceived insufficiency of probabilistic proof under traditional
tort law belies its notable veracity and dependability in scientific re-
search. Such proof should not be precluded in radiation tort simply be-
cause the law rigidly requires only mechanistic proof of "out-of-control-
Mack-truck-hits-and-kills-prudent-but-improvident-traveller" causation.
Such evaluation of causation is obsolete in a time of complex and un-
known disease etiologies and unidentified disease vectors. In order to
from tailings. Radon, when inhaled, deposits energy from alpha particles in the lung. The resulting
absorbed dose to the lung increases the risk of lung cancer. See id. at 1. 300,000 tons of uranium
mill tailings were removed and used as construction material in approximately 3,500 houses in the
vicinity of Grand Junction, Colorado. Id.
18. UMTRAP was formed under the aegis of the U.S. Department of Energy to clean up
twenty.four former uranium mill sites and any property in the vicinity of the sites which had been
contaminated with uranium mill tailings originating from those sites. Uranium Mill Tailings Radia-
tion Control Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-604, 92 Stat. 3021 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 42 U.S.C.).
19. The average indoor radon concentration of the 1065 vicinity properties monitored in Grand
Junction, Colorado was 0.065 WL. COLORADO DEPT. OF HEALTH, REMPROG FILE, GRAND
JUNCTION REMEDIAL ACTION PROGRAM. The National Research Council's Committee on the Bio-
logical Effects on Ionizing Radiations describes one working level as:
[a]ny combination of ...Po, 214Pb, 214Bi, and 214 Po (the short-lived progeny of radon) in I
liter of air, under ambient temperature and pressure, that results in the ultimate emission
of 1.3 x 10' MeV of alpha-particle energy. This is about the total amount of energy re-
leased over a long period of time by the short-lived daughters in equilibrium with 100 pCi
of radon ....
... The working-level month (WLM) was introduced so that both the duration and
level of exposure could be taken into account. The WLM is defined as the sum of the
products of the WL times the duration of exposure during some specified total period. The
unit WLM is equal to 170WL hours which corresponds to an exposure of 1WL for 170h
(approximately I working month).
COMMITrEE ON THE BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF IONIZING RADIATIONS, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
SCIENCES, HEALTH RISKS OF RADON AND OTHER INTERNALLY DEPOSITED ALPHA-EMITTERS
(BEIR IV) 140 (1988) [hereinafter BEIR IV].
20. W. KEETON, supra note 11, § 41, at 267.
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realize the goals of tort law in modem society, a new test of causation
should be adopted which would align legal cause-in-fact with scientific
probability of causation. Under such a test, the radiation tort plaintiff
would have to show a "causal linkage ' 21 between radiation and a later
cancer by proving by a preponderance of the evidence the probability
that exposure(s) to radiation "caused" the cancer. The probability of
causation should be estimated from the best scientific knowledge avail-
able from epidemiological studies of radiation-exposed populations.
Upon proving the other prima facie elements of the tort by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, the radiation tort plaintiff would then recover dam-
ages in proportion to the probability of causation proved. This would
eliminate the unjust exclusion of plaintiffs harmed by radiation exposure
and allow the actual costs of radiation use to be recognized and
redressed.
II. SCIENTIFIC DETERMINATION OF RADIOGENIC CANCER
A. Indeterminancy of Individual Cancer Causation
Probability is interjected into the study of cancer caused by exposure
to radiation at its most elemental level-radioactivity22 itself. Radioac-
tivity is the result of a process in which particles from unstable nuclei
gain enough energy from chance collisions within the nuclei to escape the
nuclear binding force.23 In the disintegration process, energetic particles
such as protons, neutrons, and alpha particles, and electromagnetic radi-
ation, such as x-rays and gamma rays, can be emitted. 24 Escape of a
nuclear particle is pure chance. Therefore, it is impossible to determine
whether any particular nucleus will disintegrate.25 All that can be deter-
mined is the probability that in a population of unstable nuclei a certain
number will disintegrate in a given time.26
Further uncertainty results from the interaction of radiation with
matter. The particles or rays interact with matter by the transfer of their
escaped energy to atoms or molecules randomly encountered, and the
21. Calabresi, supra note 13, at 71.
22. This discussion concerns natural and not artificial radioactivity. Artificial radioactivity oc-
curs in the decay of an unstable nuclide formed by the bombardment of stable nuclide with neutrons,
high energy protons, deuterons, gamma rays or alpha particles. H. JOHNS & J. CUNNINGHAM, supra
note 8, at 71.
23. H. JOHNS & J. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 8, at 71.
24. H. JOHNS & J. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 8, at 71.
25. H. JOHNS & J. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 8, at 71.
26. H. JOHNS & J. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 8, at 71.
[Vol. 24:479
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formation of ions through the addition or removal of electrons;27 hence,
the name "ionizing radiation." Although the exact mechanism of human
cancer induction by radiation is unknown, researchers assume that it is
dependent on the absorbed dose-the mean energy absorbed per unit
mass of tissue (expressed in rads).,z A random "hit" of absorbed energy
in a target cell can result in a range of effects, including neoplastic trans-
formation (carcinogenesis). z9 Studies in cancer biology have hypothe-
sized that carcinogenesis occurs when the energy absorbed by cells
through the proper hit(s) alters the genetic apparatus of the cell.3° One
proposed mechanism of cell transformation posits that such hits could
possibly activate oncogenes which in turn transform the genes of the cells
and act as initiators or promotors or both in the production of cancer
cells. 31 The process through which radiation not only "scores a hit" in a
particular cell, but transforms the cell into a cancer cell is stochastic (a
random process which can only be measured statistically). The
probability that the neoplastic transformation of a cell will occur, there-
fore, can only be determined through the study of populations of cells.3"
27. H. JOHNS & J. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 8, at 134.
28. NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, PUB. No. 85-
2748, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH AD Hoc WORKING GROUP TO DE-
VELOP RADIOEPIDEMIOLOGICAL TABLES 13 (1985) [hereinafter NIH TABLES].
In general, the relative biological effectiveness (RBE) of a given absorbed dose of charged
particle radiation depends on the spatial density of the ionizations (linear energy transfer,
or LET) produced along the tracks of the radiation, the heavy particle radiations tending
to produce very closely spaced ionizations (high LET), while electrons, x-rays and gamma
rays tend to have fewer ionizations per unit length of track (low LE).
Id. at 14.
29. Id. at 13. Bond, The Need for Probabilities in Cancer Litigation, NUCLEAR NEWS, Aug.
1986, at 63. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
30. NIH TABLES, supra note 28, at 13.
31. NIH TABLES, supra note 28, at 6. Researchers have postulated three successive stages of
tumor development: initiation, promotion, and progression.
During the initiation phase, the DNA of the target cell, which contains the genetic code, is
presumed to be damaged or structurally altered as the result of exposure to radiation....
The promotional phase of cancer development is concerned with the subsequent
changes in the initiated cell that lead to development of an overt tumor.... While a single
exposure to an initiating substance can suffice to alter DNA, promoting effects typically are
induced only by prolonged contact with the agent in question.... The progressive phase
involves the outgrowth of progressively more malignant variants of the original neoplasm.
NIH TABLES, supra note 28, at 5.
32. Bond, supra note 29, at 63. Introducing the Radiogenic Cancer Compensation Act, Senator
Hatch stated:
A given charged particle's scoring just the right hit to initiate a cancer followed by the
proper conditions for the development of that cancer are rare and substantially random
events. However, the probability of these events occurring increases as the radiation dose
increases, since more shots are being fired at the cells--so to speak. The process is stochas-
tic, i.e. it is a random process that can be measured only statistically.
S. 921, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S3921 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1983) (Questions and
answers entered into the record at the request of Sen. Hatch).
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Whatever the etiology of radiation-induced cancer, 33 the effects are
stochastic, subcellular, and unobservable. Though scientists hypothesize
that various environmental factors act as initiators and promotors, 34
which carcinogen caused a particular cancer is unknown. It is impossi-
ble, therefore, to determine whether a particular cancer in a specific indi-
vidual was caused by radiation exposure. Cancers which occur in
individuals unexposed to radiation are indistinguishable from radiogenic,
or radiation-induced, cancers.35 The indeterminancy of cancer causation
in the individual, consequently, mandates the use of population statistics
in order to ascertain the probability that radiation exposure "caused" a
particular cancer.
B. Scientific Determination of the Probability of Causation
Just as it is pure chance if radiation interacts with a particular cell
and transforms it into a cancer cell, radiogenic cancer is similarly ran-
dom with respect to the individual in which it may occur.36 The carcino-
genic effect of radiation can only be detected as randomly occurring
excess cancers within populations exposed to radiation. The science of
radioepidemiology determines this "prevalence and incidence" of radio-
genic cancer37 by comparing the number of cancers in unexposed and
exposed populations. An excess number of cancers within an exposed
population is evidence that radiation exposure is a determinant of cancer.
An inference of causation, however, is not based upon a statistical associ-
ation between radiation exposure and increased cancer incidence alone.
Radioepidemiologists deem a statistical association between radiation ex-
posure and cancer to be a causal association only if it meets certain, fur-
ther epidemiological requirements: i.e., statistical significance, specificity,
33. "The etiology of a disease may be thought of as having a sequence consisting of two parts:
(1) causal events occurring prior to some initial bodily response, and (2) mechanisms within the
body leading from the initial response to the characteristic manifestations of the disease." B. MAC-
MAHON & T. PUGH, EPIDEMIOLOGY 26 (1970).
34. Epidemiologists have inferred that 75-80% of fatal cancers in the United States are initiated
or promoted by environmental factors, such as smoking, alcohol consumption, diet, pollution, occu-
pational exposures, medical therapy and diagnosis, and viral infections. NIH TABLES, supra note
28, at 6-10.
35. NIH TABLES, supra note 28, at 17. Bond, supra note 29, at 62-63.
36. Bond, supra note 29, at 63. Catlin, Determining Probability of Causation, NUCLEAR
NEws, June 1986, at 73.
37. S. 921, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc. S3922 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1983) (Questions
and answers entered into the record at the request of Sen. Hatch). Epidemiology in general is "the
study of the distribution of disease and the search for the determinants of the observed distribution."
B. MACMAHON & T. PUGH, supra note 33, at 1.
[Vol. 24:479
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dose response, and consistency.38
No other cancer determinant has been studied as intensively as ion-
izing radiation. 39 Epidemiological studies of the atomic bomb survivors
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki,' radium dial painters,41 British spinal ar-
thritis patients,42 uranium miners,4 3 the natives of the Marshall Islands,'
38. Statistical significance aids the radioepidemiologist in determining whether the observed
difference in cancer incidence between the exposed and unexposed populations is a true difference or
is the result of the sampling process. The radioepidemiologist will usually state the "null hypothesis"
that there is no real difference in cancer incidence between the two populations. The statistical signif-
icance test computes the probability that the observed difference in cancer incidence is due to chance
if the null hypothesis is, in fact, true. If the probability is small (5% is the common probability
value), then the radioepidemiologist rejects the null hypothesis and concludes that the observed
difference is a true difference. See generally J. FLEISS, STATISTICAL METHODS FOR RATES AND
PROPORTIONS 33-49 (2d ed. 1981). Statistical significance "depends on the total number of cancer
cases observed and the apparent size of the excess relative to the baseline risk." NIH TABLES, supra
note 28, at 16. The specificity of the causal association is the measure of the probability that the
excess cancer in the exposed population is the result of some factor other than radiation. The
smaller the probability, the more specific the causal association between radiation exposure and
cancer. NIH TABLES, supra note 28, at 16.
If there is a causal association, then cancer incidence should increase with increasing dose.
While radioepiderniological studies have found a linear dose-response for high doses of radiation,
excess cancer cannot be observed in exposed populations at low doses. Because cancers can arise
from the random transformation of a single cell, it is presumed that there is no threshold dose below
which radiation exposure is safe. The risk from lower-dose exposure, therefore, must be extrapo-
lated from the linear, high dose-response relationship. This requires the use of a mathematical
model. The model generally accepted by radiobiologists for low-LET radiation is the linear-quad-
ratic model.
The model assumes that two ionizing events are more likely to produce a biological effect if
they occur very close together than if they are separated; because ionizing events tend to be
widely spaced along low-LET tracks, closely-spaced events are likely to be at the intersec-
tions of different tracks and their probabilities are approximately proportional to the
square of dose.
NIH TABLES, supra note 28, at 24. "The above considerations do not apply to high-LET radiation,
for which close spacing of the ionizing events along the radiation tracks is the rule, rather than the
exception. Both theoretical and experimental studies suggest that, for high-LET radiation, the dose-
response tends to be linear .. " NIH TABLES, supra note 28, at 25.
Consistency in the associations observed between radiation exposure and increased cancer inci-
dence from the study of different exposed populations adds credence to the inference that the statisti-
cal association is a causal association. More credence is placed "in associations that turn up
frequently and under diverse circumstances of exposure," than in "isolated reports not verified by
other experience." NIH TABLES, supra note 28, at 16-17.
39. Catlin, supra note 36, at 74.
40. NIH TABLES, supra note 28, at 15.
41. Radioepidemiological studies of workers who ingested radium while painting instrument
dials with radium paint showed an increase in cancer incidence due to internal dose from alpha-
particle radiation. NIH TABLES, supra note 28, at 15.
42. British patients who suffered from ankylosing spondylitis, a spinal arthritis, were treated
with a course of x-ray therapy. An increase in cancer was noted in the group of patients. Beebe,
supra note 1, at 37.
43. A causal association between lung cancer and the inhalation of radon has been observed in
the radioepidemiological studies of uranium miners. NIH TABLES, supra note 28, at 15.
44. The Marshallese were exposed to radioactive fallout from nuclear weapons testing in the
Pacific in 1954. NIH TABLES, supra note 28, at 15.
1989]
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hyperthyroid patients,4 and most significantly, patients exposed to ther-
apeutic x-radiation46 have well-documented the causal association be-
tween radiation and cancer. The data and conclusions from these
radioepidemiological studies have been reviewed and analyzed by such
eminent scientific advisory committees as the National Academy of Sci-
ences Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation, the Na-
tional Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements Committee,
and the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic
Radiation. These committees, through rigorous scientific evaluation of
radioepidemiological studies, assess which dose-response 47 and risk pro-
jection model48 best fit the data and determine the risk of cancer associ-
ated with a given dose of radiation.
The National Institute of Health working group relied upon these
radioepidemiological studies for the production of probability of causa-
tion tables. The Orphan Drug Act, passed by Congress and enacted on
January 4, 1983, required the Secretary of Health and Human Services to
produce "radioepidemiological tables that estimate the likelihood that
persons who have or have had any of the radiation related cancers and
who have received specific doses prior to the onset of such disease devel-
oped cancer as a result of these doses."'49 The result of this legislation
was the compilation of the best epidemiological estimates of cancer risk
from radiation exposure50 and the publication of these risk coefficients in
45. "The largest number of persons studied who were exposed to low-LET radiation at low
dose and dose rate were patients who received oral iodine-131 for the treatment of hypothyroidism."
NIH TABLES, supra note 28, at 15 (footnote omitted).
46. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
47. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
48. The expression of cancer generally requires a long latency period. Because most radiogenic
cancers occur throughout a person's lifetime, none of the radiation exposed groups studied have been
observed long enough to determine the full effects of their exposures. The result of this is that a risk
projection model must be selected in order to assess the lifetime cancer risk due to radiation. The
risk projection model can, therefore, estimate the risk for a longer period of time than currently
available observation data will allow.
The two primary models used for lifetime projection of cancer risk are the absolute-risk model
and the relative-risk model. The absolute-risk model projects the average number of excess cancer
cases per unit of population, time, and dose. It is additive in that it adds the same average number or
a constant incidence of excess cancer deaths to the natural incidence of cancer death across time.
The relative-risk model projects the currently observed average percentage increase in cancer risk
per unit dose into future years. It is multiplicative in that it multiplies the natural age-specific cancer
risk by the percent increase due to radiation exposure. Because the natural incidence of most can-
cers increases with age, the relative-risk model projects greater lifetime risk from radiation exposure
than that projected by the absolute-risk model. NIH TABLES, supra note 28, at 19-23.
49. Act of Jan. 4, 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-414, § 7(b)(1), 96 Stat. 2059, 2060.
50. "Forty of the 78 risk coefficients in the working group report were obtained from the 1980
report of the third National Academy of Sciences Committee on Biological Effects of Ionizing Radi-
ation (BEIR III); an additional 38 coefficients were recalculated from 1984 data for lung, breast,
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the Report of the National Institutes of Health Ad Hoc Working Group
to Develop Radioepidemiological Tables (NIH tables).51
The primary assumption upon which the tables are based is that the
probability of radiation exposure causing any individual cancer can be
determined from the probability of increased cancer incidence within ex-
posed populations. In other words, the NIH tables recognize that the
only determination of a potential cause of a stochastic disease such as
cancer is that observed through the study of populations exposed to the
suspected carcinogen. The NIH tables express this increased risk as the
probability of causation.
Probability of causation is defined as the cancer risk attributable to
radiation divided by the total cancer risk from all causes.52 It is esti-
mated as the risk that radiation caused a particular cancer divided by the
sum of the radiation risk and the background or baseline risk of the par-
ticular cancer.53 Given that relative risk is equal to the radiation risk
divided by the background risk, the probability of causation is equal to
the relative risk divided by (1 + relative risk). 4 Consequently,
probability of causation estimates are dependent on the radioepidemio-
logical determination of relative risk, which in turn, is derived from pop-
ulation statistics.55 For example, if a population of 10,000 exposed to a
radiation dose of 15 rads manifests an incidence of 440 cancers, while a
similar, but unexposed population of 10,000 shows only 400 cancers, the
probability of causation would be the relative risk, 40/400, divided by (1
+ 40/400), or 9%. Given that an individual is representative of the ref-
erence populations from which the radioepidemiological risk is derived,
the probability that an individual exposed to 15 rads, who later develops
cancer, is 9% that the cancer was caused by the radiation exposure.
By reference to the NIH tables, it is therefore possible to determine
the scientific probability that an individual's cancer was "caused" by ex-
posure to radiation. The probability of causation estimated from the
NIH tables is proportional to the radiation dose to the individual organ
thyroid, and salivary gland cancer." Jacobson, Radioepidemiological Tables, 257 J.A.M.A. 806, 808
(1987) (footnote omitted).
51. See supra note 28.
52. Jacobson, supra note 50, at 807.
53. Jacobson, supra note 50, at 807. Bond, supra note 29, at 64. The baseline or background
risk of particular cancers were taken from the Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results Pro-
gram. See NAT'L CANCER INST., NCI MONOGR. 57, SURVEILLANCE, EPIDEMIOLOGY, AND END
RESULTS. INCIDENCE AND MORTALrrY DATA: 1973-1977 (1981).
54. Jacobson, supra note 50, at 807.
55. Catlin, supra note 36, at 73.
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or tissue and its associated risk coefficient, and inversely proportional to
the background probability of developing the same type of cancer.56 The
NIH risk coefficients are a function of radiation dose to the relevant tis-
sue, the time between exposure and diagnosis,5" sex,58 age at exposure,5 9
and for some cancers, age at diagnosis.6' Because the radiation dose and
the type of cancer are specific to the individual, and the risk coefficient
and background cancer risk are specific to "that person's age, sex, and
type of tumor," the population statistics used in the probability of causa-
tion calculation are "as closely matched as possible to the person of
interest."61
The probability that radiation exposure caused an individual cancer
can be illustrated through the paradigm found in the introduction.
Given Dena Smith's exposure to 0.065 Working Levels62 for 11 years,
and assuming a 75% occupancy of her house each day, 365 days a year,
as well as a multiplicative interaction between radiation and smoking,6 3
the relevant risk coefficient from the NIH tables' would estimate a 25%
probability that her exposure to radon gas caused her lung cancer.65 The
scientific determination of causation, therefore, is that there is a 25%
56. Bond, supra note 29, at 64.
57. NIH TABLES, supra note 28, at 19-23.
58. NIH TABLES, supra note 28, at 17.
59. NIH TABLES, supra note 28, at 18-19.
60. NIH TABLES, supra note 28, at 57-60.
61. Bond, supra note 29, at 64.
62. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
63. NIH TABLES, supra note 28, at 48-50. "Smoking of tobacco, particularly in the form of
cigarettes, is generally recognized as the single most important external risk factor for human cancer,
being estimated to cause 25-40% of all cancer deaths in the U.S. ." NIH TABLES, supra note 28,
at 7.
The interaction between smoking and radiation in carcinogenesis is determined to be either
additive or multiplicative. If the total risk from a radiation exposure and smoking is assumed to be
"the sum of the excess risks from each of the two taken separately," the two factors interact addi-
tively. NIH TABLES, supra note 28, at 47. If the relative risk due to radiation exposure and smoking
is "the product of the relative risks of the two factors taken separately," the two factors interact
multiplicatively. NIH TABLES, supra note 28, at 48.
If the multiplicative interaction model holds, then the probability of causation for radiation
exposure does not vary according to the smoking history. This model appears to fit uranium miner
studies "as between exposure to radon measured in cumulative Working Level Months and cigarette
smoking measured as accumulated pack-years." NIH TABLES, supra note 28, at 48.
64. The relevant risk coefficient is 1.2 percent per WLM. NIH TABLES, supra note 28, at 233.
The BEIR IV committee has subsequently estimated the risk coefficient as 1.5 percent per WLM
based on further evaluation of radioepidemiological studies of uranium miners. BEIR IV, supra note
19, at 40.
65. The relative risk is calculated as (.75) (.065 WL) (WLM/170 WL hr) (24 hr/d)(365 d/yr)
(11 yr) (1.2%/WLM) = 0.33. The probability of causation equals the relative risk divided by (I +
relative risk), or 0.33 / 1.33 = 0.25 or 25%.
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probability that Dena's lung cancer was caused by the radon gas
exposure.
III. LEGAL DETERMINATION OF CAUSE-IN-FACT
Whatever tort theory Dena Smith decides to present in a court of
law-negligence, strict liability, or product liability-she must prove that
the radiation exposure was more likely than not the legal cause of her
lung cancer. Legal or "proximate" cause differs from scientific cause in
that it is a policy determination of whether the cause of the injury is one
upon which the society wishes to impose liability.6 Proximate cause
seeks to limit legal responsibility "to those causes which are so closely
connected with the result and of such significance that the law is justified
in imposing liability."67 An element of proximate cause is cause-in-fact.
Cause-in-fact is a "necessary antecedent" causally connected to the in-
jury. 8 Before any explicit limitations on liability may be imposed under
proximate cause, the plaintiff must first prove that the radiation was in
fact a cause of the injury.
The problem in proving causation in radiation tort cases is not any
policy-imposed limitation on liability under proximate cause. In fact, the
foreseeability and significance of injury due to exposure to radiation is
certainly recognized, most obviously in the determination of nuclear en-
ergy as "abnormally dangerous"69 and subject to strict liability in tort.70
The problem with proving legal causation is in proving that the radiation
exposure was in fact the cause of the injury.
Dena Smith has an impossible burden to prove. The best scientific
proof of causation that she can offer is insufficient proof of cause-in-fact:
1) It fails because the radiation dose cannot pass the "but-for" and "sub-
stantial factor" tests of cause-in-fact of the cancer; and 2) Even if the
evidence of probability of causation is deemed sufficient evidence of
cause-in-fact, she is unable to prove that the radiation dose more likely
than not (greater than 50% probability) caused the lung cancer. Cause-
66. W. KEETON, supra note 11, § 41, at 264.
67. W. KEETON, supra note 11, § 41, at 264.
68. W. KEETON, supra note 11, § 41, at 265.
69. W. KEETON, supra note 11, § 78, at 558-59.
70. This is not to say that there are no statutory limitations on liability in the event of a nuclear
accident. The Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1975), was passed by Congress in 1957 "in
order to protect the public and to encourage the development of the atomic energy industry." 42
U.S.C. § 2012(i) (1982). Nuclear energy development is encouraged by limiting aggregate liability of
the licensee in the event of the accident to $560 million. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e) (1982).
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in-fact, the "neutral" element of causation, in effect precludes recovery
for many, if not all, radiation tort plaintiffs.
A. The Inadequacy of the But-For and Substantial Factor Tests
The two tests which determine cause-in-fact are the "but-for" and
"substantial factor" tests. The "but-for" test identifies an act or omission
as the cause of the event "if the event would not have occurred but for
that conduct."'" The "substantial factor" test allows the inclusion of sit-
uations in which two or more causes concur to give rise to an event.
Under this test, an act or omission "is a cause of the event if it was a
material element and a substantial factor in bringing it about.""2 In ef-
fect, the substantial factor test is an extension of the "but-for" test in that
without two or more identified causes acting together, the event would
not occur. The scientific evidence of radiation exposure as a cause of
cancer would not meet the requirements of either test.
Dena Smith would be unable to show that but for her exposure to
radon gas, she would not have developed lung cancer. Because there is
no way to distinguish a radiation-induced cancer from other cancers, she
could not introduce medical proof that her lung cancer was caused by the
radon exposure. The clinical and laboratory tests available to physicians
can only specify the type of tumor and the amount of damage produced
by the tumor to normal cells.73 There are no markers in the tumor cells
which would distinguish them as induced by radiation rather than some
other causative agent. "The proof of causation sought by the legal sys-
tem through this traditional 'medical expert approach' is thus rendered
impossible."'74
Dena Smith would also fail in demonstrating that radon exposure
was a substantial factor in causing her lung cancer. The "substantial
factor" test allows for two or more causes, but not two or more in-
dependent causes.7 5 Though radiation exposure alone is sufficient to
71. W. KEETON, supra note 11, § 41, at 266.
72. W. KEETON, supra note 11, § 41, at 267.
73. Bond, supra note 29, at 63. Bond states that clinical tests are only valuable for determina-
tion of causation of disease "due to the dysfunction of entire organs or tissues" because "many of
these procedures also yield clues to or are specific for the causative agent." Bond, supra note 29, at
63. This is not the case when dealing with disease caused by the transformation of a single cell. "No
trace of causative agent remains in the daughter cells that constitute the tumor." Bond, supra note
29, at 63.
74. Bond, supra note 29, at 62.
75. W. KEETON, supra note 11, § 41, at 266. See also Delgado, Beyond Sindell: Relaxation of
Cause-In-Fact Rules for Indeterminate Plaintiffs, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 881, 887 (1982); Comment,
[Vol. 24:479
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cause cancer, radiation can join with other factors to complete the malig-
nant transformation of a cell.76 In such case, the interaction between
radiation and another factor would be synergistic, or dependent." If all
other possible independent "causes" of the cancer were eliminated, then
each of the two dependent factors, if a material element in bringing about
the cancer, would be a substantial factor and would meet the test for
cause-in-fact.78 For instance, if Dena could show that the interaction of
radiation exposure and smoking caused her lung cancer, radiation could
still meet the substantial factor test, even though the exposure or smok-
ing alone might have been sufficient to cause the cancer. The problem is
that Dena is unable to prove what has in fact caused her cancer. Given
the natural or background occurrence of lung cancer, Dena would be
unable to show that but for her exposure to radiation alone or combined
with smoking, she would not have developed lung cancer. The substan-
tial factor test as applied to tort claims of radiation-induced cancer pro-
duces the same legal conclusion as the but-for test.
B. Proof of Causation
Because Dena Smith would not be able to show direct cause-in-fact
under the "but-for" and "substantial factor" tests, she would have to
present circumstantial proof that her exposure to radiation was more
likely than not the cause-in-fact of her lung cancer.79 The obstacles in-
herent in demonstrating such proof lie in 1) the use of epidemiology as
evidence of causation, 2) the long latency periods for cancer induction,
and 3) the difficulty of showing a greater than fifty percent chance that
radiation caused the cancer.
Because all radioepidemiological proof of causation relies on a sta-
tistical association between radiation exposure and cancer, most criticism
of this proof is directed at its statistical base. Traditionally, the courts
Epidemiologic Proof of Probability: Implementing the Proportional Recovery Approach in Toxic Ex-
posure Torts, 89 DICK. L. REv. 233, 242 (1984).
76. NIH TABLES, supra note 28, at 6. Radiation can act as an initiator or a promoter or both.
It can therefore join with other carcinogens as an initiator or promoter and contribute to the devel-
opment of a cancer cell. Or radiation can act as a complete carcinogen, fulfilling both functions of
initiation and promotion. NIH TABLES, supra note 28, at 6.
77. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
78. W. KEETON, supra note 11, § 41, at 267.
79. W. KEETON, supra note 11, § 41, at 269. "A mere possibility of such causation is not
enough; and when the matter remains one of pure speculation or conjecture, or the probabilities are
at best evenly balanced, it becomes the duty of the court to direct a verdict for the defendant." W.
KEETON, supra note 11, § 41, at 269 (footnotes omitted).
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treated statistical evidence as inadmissible hearsay."0 Although it is now
admitted as a hearsay exception, in many cases judges have not treated
statistical "evidence with much more respect than if they had merely
excluded it on the grounds of hearsay."'"
The primary argument against the use of epidemiology is its use of
population statistics to prove cause in an individual case. 2 It is argued
that the only relevance epidemiological studies have to causation of the
individual's cancer is a showing of increased risk of cancer, not actual
cause of the individual's cancer.83 Furthermore, only the subjective judg-
ments of epidemiologists determine if a statistical association is a causal
association and if the findings from a study population can be extrapo-
lated to other populations.84 Though such arguments can be countered
by ensuring that the individual is representative of the studied population
and that appropriate attention is given to the characteristics of the popu-
lation studied,85 several judges and commentators argue that an inference
80. P. RHEINGOLD, N. LANDAU & M. CANAVAN, Toxic TORTS 403 (1977).
81. Id at 410. See also McGovern, Toxic Substances Litigation in the Fourth Circuit, 16 U.
RICH. L. REv. 247, 296-98 (1983). McGovern states:
Although some attorneys have been successful in introducing epidemiological and other
statistical studies into evidence, they must, however, overcome arguments suggesting that
these studies are unreliable, irrelevant, unnecessary, hearsay and not subject to cross-exam-
ination ....
... Defendants have argued that this type of testimony is inherently prejudicial be-
cause the defense cannot cross-examine the witness upon the controls, assumptions, soft
variables, validity and other factors inherent in the studies that form the basis of the expert
opinion.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
82. Dore, A Commentary on the Use of Epidemiological Evidence in Demonstrating Cause-In-
Fact, 7 HARv. ENvrL. L. REv. 429, 433-35 (1983). "[E]pidemiology cannot determine which par-
ticular factor caused a particular person's disease, but only what factors are statistically associated
with the occurrence of disease in groups of people." Id. at 433 (footnote omitted). See Catlin, supra
note 36, at 73.
83. Dore, supra note 82, at 436. MoElveen & Eddy, Cancer and Toxic Substances: The Prob-
lem of Causation and the Use of Epidemiology, 33 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 29, 60 (1984-85).
84. Dote, supra note 82, at 432-33. "Epidemiologists must make subjective judgments in decid-
ing whether these biases are significant enough to preclude valid inferences to other populations."
Dore, supra note 82, at 433 (footnote omitted). See supra note 38 and accompanying text. See also
NIH TABLES, supra note 28, at 27-29.
85. Hall & Silbergeld, Reappraising Epidemiology: .4 Response to Mr. Dore, 7 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REv. 441 (1983). The authors argue:
Mr. Dore seems to have two problems with epidemiological evidence: (I) its application to
individual cases,... and (2) its extrapolation from a restricted group to the population as a
whole, which is primarily a scientific issue. Epidemiology by its nature attempts to design
studies on representative populations. In some cases, these may represent unusual sub-
groups in the U.S. population, and Mr. Dore's restrictions on extrapolation are then appro-
priate. However, extrapolation from the groups studied to another larger group or to the
U.S. population as a whole is valid when appropriate attention is given to characteristics of
the population initially studied. The criteria and procedures for making such extrapola-
tions are part of an epidemiologist's professional training.
Id. at 442. (footnotes omitted).
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of causation based on population statistics is not a specific conclusion of
causation in the individual.8 6
Another inherent difficulty in proving that radiation exposure has
caused a specific cancer is the long latency period of cancer induction.
The legal system incorporates the popular perception that an effect fol-
lows an identified cause close in time. Radioepidemiologists, conversely,
determine the plausibility of a causal association between a radiation ex-
posure and cancer according to whether the time from exposure to diag-
nosis coincides with the long latency periods observed in studies of
exposed populations.8 7 The minimum latency period for a radiogenic
cancer is two-to-four years for bone cancer and leukemia, and ten or
more years for other cancers.88 These long latency periods undermine
legal determination of causation by increasing the possibility of interven-
ing causes, 9 while supporting scientific assessment of causation by re-
flecting appropriate temporal factors. The amount of time necessary for
a tumor to reach the detectable size of millions of cells after an often
protracted promotion stage in carcinogenesis 90 is frequently ignored as a
relevant factor in a legal determination of cause and effect.
Finally, the plaintiff must prove that the radiation exposure was
more likely than not the cause of the plaintiff's cancer.91 This is gener-
ally interpreted as showing a probability greater than fifty percent.92 As
86. Robinson v. U.S., 533 F. Supp. 320, 326 (E.D. Mich. 1982) ("[T]here is no epidemiological
or biostatistical method which definitely establishes whether an individual case of GBS is caused by
the individual's receipt of the swine flu vaccine or by other factors."); Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co.
v. Parker, 418 S.W. 2d 570, 574 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), aff'd, 440 S.W.2d 43 (1969) ("[A]n inference
of causal connection can be no more than speculation and conjecture."); Garner v. Hecla Mining
Co., 19 Utah 2d 367, 370, 431 P.2d 794, 796 (1967); Dickson, Medical Causation by Statistics, 17
FORuM 792, 801-05 (1982); Dore, supra note 82, at 433.
87. NIH TABLES, supra note 28, at 19-23.
88. Beebe, supra note 1, at 39.
89. Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247 (D. Utah 1984), rev'd, 816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir.
1987) (on grounds of sovereign immunity), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 694 (1988). The court stated:
The great length of time involved (eg., A irradiates B, who develops a tumor 22 years
later) allows the possible involvement of "intervening causes," sources of injury wholly
apart from the defendant's activities, which obscure the factual connection between the
plaintiff's injury and the defendant's purportedly wrongful conduct. The mere passage of
time is sufficient to raise doubts about "cause" in the minds of a legal system accustomed to
far more immediate chains of events.
Iae at 406. See O'Toole, Radiation, Causation, and Compensation, 54 GEO. L. J. 751, 765 (1966).
90. NIH TABLES, supra note 28, at 19-23.
91. W. KEETON, supra note 11, § 41, at 269. See Delgado, supra note 75, at 887.
92. Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A 'Public Law' Vision of the
Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REv. 851, 857 (1984); Black & Lilienfeld, Epidemiologic Proof in Toxic
Tort Litigation, 52 FoRDHAm L. Rav. 732, 767 (1984). Contra Note, Causation in Toxic Torts
Burdens of Proof Standards of Persuasion, and Statistical Evidence, 96 YALE L.J. 376, 380-86
(1986). Author Steve Gold points out that the burden of proof consists of a factual burden and the
amount of credence given that fact. When probabilistic evidence of causation is introduced, courts
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in the case of Dena Smith, such proof is unlikely for most radiation tort
plaintiffs. In order to show a probability of causation greater than fifty
percent, the plaintiff would have to prove a statistical increase greater
than one hundred percent of the natural incidence of cancer.93 Given the
high natural or background occurrence of cancer, this is very difficult to
prove. The plaintiff would have to prove exposure to a very high radia-
tion dose to meet a probability greater than fifty percent. 94 As there is no
evidence of a threshold level below which radiation exposure is not po-
tentially carcinogenic, many plaintiffs with probability of causation esti-
mates below fifty percent will have cancers caused by radiation exposure,
yet will lack the requisite proof.95
C. Two Cases Representing Causation Problem
In Garner v. Ilecla Mining Co.,96 the Utah Supreme Court rejected
the use of radioepidemiological evidence of higher lung cancer incidence
among uranium miners as proof that Garner, a uranium miner for over
twenty years, developed lung cancer due to his work in the mines. The
plaintiff presented additional evidence that Garner had thirty-four times
as much lead-21097 in his bones as normal and that the Hecla mine con-
tained 2.5 times as much radon gas concentration as recommended by
then existing federal government standards.98 In addition, the plaintiff
presented an expert witness who testified that "there was a very high
generally collapse the fact probability with the belief probability. Courts then determine that the fact
probability (probability of causation) rather than the belief probability must be greater than fifty
percent. "Where a traditional court would have sought a >50% belief in a yes-or-no fact, a 'collaps-
ing' court seeks a yes-or-no belief in a >50% fact probability." Id. at 388.
93. Allen, 588 F. Supp. at 418. "The mechanical application ofa 'greater-than-100%-increase'
test in this context represents merely the refabrication of the 'but-for' test of causation in mathemati-
cal form: but for defendant's 50 plus percent share of the statistically identified injuries, plaintiff
would probably not have been hurt." Id.
94. See S. 921, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S3921 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1983) (Ques-
tions and answeres enterred into the record at the request of Sen. Hatch).
95. It is also possible that plaintiffs with probability of causation estimates greater than fifty
percent, though having requisite proof, will have cancers not caused by radiation exposure. See
Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L. REv. 543 (1962). "A victim's
hurt as the result, at least in part, of a defendant's conduct may be highly improbable and yet
admittedly true, while on the other hand it may be highly probable and yet the result of other cause
factors." Id. at 557.
96. 19 Utah 2d 367, 431 P.2d 794 (1967).
97. Id at 369, 431 P.2d at 796. Lead-210 (Pb-210) is the end-product, or stable nuclide, that
results from the disintegration of radon and its progeny. The amount of Pb-210 in Garner's body




Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 24 [1988], Iss. 3, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol24/iss3/6
RADIATION TORT LITIGATION
possibility" 99 that Garner's lung cancer was caused by the radon expo-
sure. The court acknowledged that "[w]hile it seems logical that the un-
usually high incidence of lung cancer in uranium miners"" would
indicate a higher probability than normal that the radiation exposure was
the cause of Gamer's cancer, "it nevertheless falls short of compelling a
finding that such was the cause in any individual case." 101 The court,
therefore, refused to accept epidemiological evidence of population statis-
tics as proof of individual causation, even though in this case, the plaintiff
was without doubt representative of the population.
In a more recent case, Johnston v. United States,"°2 the United States
District Court in Kansas found that evidence of radiation-induced can-
cers based on statistics "do not measure up to Prosser's test of proof of
causation."103 Four plaintiffs, former employees of an aircraft instru-
ment and development plant, alleged that their respective cancers-leu-
kemia, lung, thyroid, and colon cancer-were caused by their exposure
to radium from aircraft instrument dials. The plaintiffs' expert witnesses
used a probability of causation calculation which the judge determined to
be "statistical speculation based upon speculative dose estimates and
speculative risk assumptions. In other words, it is speculation based
upon speculation."" °  The judge blurred the distinctions of methodology
based on statistical analysis from medical opinion,10 5 concluding that
even a statistically based probability greater than fifty percent would not
meet the standard of proving causation to a "reasonable degree of medi-
cal certainty." 106 It is unclear whether this opinion is an attack on
probability of causation calculations based on epidemiological studies, or
a diatribe against the plaintiff's expert's use of the calculation.
10 7
99. Id. at 369-70, P.2d at 796.
100. Id. at 370, P.2d at 796.
101. Id.
102. 597 F. Supp. 374 (D. Kan. 1984).
103. Id. at 425.
104. Id. at 394.
105. Id. at 412-13.
106. Id. at 413. The court applied the standard for a medical opinion. No radiation tort plaintiff
would be able to meet this standard of proof. See Bond, supra note 29, at 62-63.
107. This case is an excellent example of the "battle of the experts." Judge Kelly's frustration
arose from the vast difference between the plaintiff's experts' probability of causation estimates and
the defendant's. Because Judge Kelly did not believe the plaintiff's experts, he attacked the use of
probability of causation calculations because of the ease of manipulation of dose and risk coefficient.
Though this paper advocates the use of the same probability of causation calculation, the risk coeffi-
cient adopted by the NIH tables is presumed to be the best estimate of risk based on radioepidemio-
logical data. The adoption of the PC coefficients from the NIH tables will therefore decrease the
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IV. SUGGESTED REFORM IN LEGAL ANALYSIS OF CAUSATION
A. Reevaluation of Cause-in-Fact
Legal and scientific causation were not always so distinct. Before
the 1920's, tort theory embraced the scientific notion of "objective causa-
tion" 10 which was cast in the mold of classical physics. Classical phys-
ics described a mechanical world in which cause and effect ruled.
"Things moved for reasons. These reasons were based upon earlier
causes for motion. Therefore, all motion was determined and everything
was predictable .... The observer observed, never disturbed."10 9 The
evidence of cause and effect was particularistic-a "particular action...
had the 'causal power' to cause an injury" 1 '--and the role of the court
was to identify the particular action, and hold the culpable actor liable
for the injury caused. Also borrowed from classical physics was the
"chain of causation"' in which each causal link brought about its deter-
mined effect. Liability for an injury resulting from a "chain of causa-
tion" would be imposed as long as no intervening cause disrupted its
domino effect and thereby acquired the mystical causal power to produce
the injury.1"2 According to the theory of objective causation, the court
identified rather than selected the culpable actor whose action indisputa-
bly caused the injury. Law and science were comfortable bedfellows,
smug in a world of effects determined from certain causes.
The advent of quantum theory in physics and in particular the
Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle signaled the end of this mechanistic
era. 3 The Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle affirmed the imprecision
and uncertainty of measuring or predicting atomic events. Heisenberg
108. Horwitz, The Doctrine of Objective Causation, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 201 (D. Kairys
ed. 1982).
109. F. WOLF, TAKING THE QUANTUM LEAP 56 (1981).
110. Brennan & Carter, Legal and Scientific Probability of Causation of Cancer and Other Envi-
ronmental Disease in Individuals, 10 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 33, 53 (1985). See also Rosen-
berg, supra note 92, at 870. See generally Saks & Kidd, Human Information Processing and
Adjudication: Trial by Heuristics, 15 LAw & Soc'y 123 (1980-81).
The concept of "particularistic" evidence suggests that there exists a form of proof that can
provide direct and actual knowledge of the causal relationship between the defendant's
tortious conduct and the plaintiff's injury. "Particularstic" evidence, however, is in fact
no less probabilistic than is the statistical evidence that courts purport to shun. All knowl-
edge of past as well as future events is probabilistic. Inevitably it rests on intuitive or more
rigorously acquired impressions of the frequency with which similar events have occurred
in like circumstances. "Particularistic" evidence offers nothing more than a basis for con-
clusions about a perceived balance of probabilities.
Rosenberg, supra note 92, at 870.
111. H. HART & A. HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 5 (1959).
112. Id.
113. F. WOLF, supra note 109, at 115.
[Vol. 24:479
20
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 24 [1988], Iss. 3, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol24/iss3/6
RADIATION TORT LITIGATION
determined that it was impossible to observe both the momentum and
position of an atomic particle, because in an attempt to see the particle
(its position), the measuring system (source of light) would transfer its
momentum to the particle and the particle would move out of focus. 114
In other words, the observer disturbed." 5
The impact of quantum theory was to strip away any pretense of
objectivity in the scientific determination of cause and effect. What was
external and objective became internal and subjective. The mysterious
causal power once believed inherent in objects and events lay in the mind
of the observer who inferred causation from the frequent conjunction of
objects and events. 116 The predictable clockwork world of interlocking
wheels and springs exploded into a world of randomness and probability.
Legal theorists in turn challenged the premise of objective or actual
causation in tort law.' Proximate or legal cause supplanted objective
causation by imposing or limiting liability to conduct which could
foreseeably cause an injury. Foreseeability allowed the observer to dis-
turb, and consequently, causal chains were woven into causal webs of
social policy. With the advent of proximate cause, business, once pro-
tected by the fiction of objective causation, became the logical insurer of
injuries foreseeably caused by its acts or omissions." 8
The irony of the history of legal causation is that objective causation
is still alive and well in the form of cause-in-fact. Courts still look to
particularistic evidence of cause-in-fact, attributing causal powers to spe-
cific acts, totally ignoring the observer's role in drawing causal connec-
tions from observed frequencies of conjoined objects or events. For
114. F. WOLF, supra note 109, at 108-11. See also J. HONNER, THE DESCRIPTION OF NATURE
45 (1987).
115. F. WOLF, supra note 109, at 65. R. PETRucci, GENERAL CHEMISTRY 165 (2d ed. 1977).
Petrucci suggests that a helpful analogy to understanding the effect of observation on the event
observed is that of a basketball game and a movie. "In viewing a motion picture, no matter what the
reaction of the audience, the plot is predetermined and is unaffected by this reaction. With a basket-
ball game, on the other hand, the course and final outcome of the game can be affected by the
response of the spectators." Id.
116. This epistemology of causation was articulated by Hume:
[H]ow often must we repeat to ourselves, that the simple view of any two objects or actions,
however related, can never give us any idea of power, or of a connexion betwixt them: that
this idea arises from the repetition of their union: that the repetition neither discovers nor
causes any thing in the objects, but has an influence only on the mind, by that customary
transition it produces: that this customary transition is, therefore, the same with the power
and necessity; which are consequently qualities of perceptions, not of objects, and are inter-
nally felt by the soul, and not perceiv'd externally in bodies?
D. HUMiE, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 166 (Selby-Bigge ed. 1888).
117. Horwitz, supra note 108, at 201.
118. Horwitz, supra note 108, at 210-11.
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example, in a negligence claim against the landlord, the tenant who fell
on the ice on the sidewalk of a common area, claims that but for the
existence of the ice, she would not have fallen and injured herself.
Though it can be argued that it is the particularistic evidence of seeing
the ice which persuades us that its presence was the cause of the tenant's
injury, a closer inspection of the reasoning reveals that it is the observed
frequency of such falls in like circumstances which leads us to believe the
relationship between the ice and the fall to be causal. 1 9 This evidence is
probabilistic, not particularistic.
The danger ofjudical decisions in radiation or toxic tort cases which
exclude probabilistic proof of causation is that they are often based on
the assumption that, given time, science will reveal the specific, particu-
laristic cause or causes of an event.1 20 The fallacy of this reasoning is
apparent in light of quantum theory and the Heisenberg Uncertainty
Principle. "In a world of randomness, where there is no necessary con-
nection between particular causes and effects, all we can hope to do is to
statistically correlate acts and consequences in the aggregate."' 21 The
result of such decisions is that plaintiffs who have to rely on probabilistic
proof of causation are not compensated for their injuries and the risk of
doing business is not borne by the business nor adequately assessed by
society. 22 Policy decisions so covertly operative can only portend disre-
gard of the safety of many and protection of the interests of few.
B. "Causal Linkage" Test of Cause-in-Fact
The inadequacy of the traditional "but-for" and "substantial factor"
tests of cause-in-fact has been shown in several judicial decisions. 123 To
remedy this problem in cases of negligence, judges have simply shifted
the burden of proof to the defendant once certain factual connections
119. Contra Note, supra note 92, at 384 n.42.
120. Brennan & Carter, supra note 110, at 54.
121. Horwitz, supra note 108, at 210.
122. Horwitz quotes Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. who noted that:
[most injuries] with which our courts are kept busy today are mainly incidents of certain
well-known businesses. They are injuries to person or property by railroads, factories, and
the like. The liability for them is estimated, and sooner or later goes into the price paid by
the public. The public really pays the damages, and the question of liability, if pressed far
enough, is really the question how far it is desirable that the public should insure the safety
of those whose work it uses.
Horwitz, supra note 108, at 211 (quoting OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in
COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 187 (1920)) (footnote omitted).
123. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980);
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between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injury are made.1 24
These factual connections in no way meet the traditional tests for cause-
in-fact. For example, in Summers v. Tice, although there was a particu-
laristic cause-in-fact relationship between the plaintiff's injury and the
conduct of one of the defendants, the plaintiff was unable to prove which
defendant's conduct was the cause of his injury.1 25 The only factual con-
nection established between the plaintiff and each of the defendants was
that the defendants had each negligently fired a shotgun in the plaintiff's
direction. 26 The justification for shifting the burden of proof of causa-
tion upon a showing of such factual connection is that both of the de-
fendants were negligent and that they, therefore, should not be
exonerated from liability. Though many consider the decision in Sum-
mers v. Tice to be a just one, the reasoning employed simply begs the
question. The plaintiff, in essence, did not have to prove his prima facie
case of negligence, because the defendants' conduct was negligent. Such
arguments, unfortunately, become necessary in order to reach a just deci-
sion, as long as the tests for cause-in-fact are so limited.
Several commentators have urged that shifting the burden of proof
to the defendant after some showing of factual connection is not only the
answer to the problem of the indeterminate defendant, but also to that of
the indeterminate plaintiff.1 27 The plaintiff is indeterminate in radiation
cases because the epidemiological evidence of proof of causation only di-
rectly proves the existence of excess cancer caused by radiation exposure
to a population. Whether the plaintiff's specific cancer has been caused
by radiation exposure or by "natural" causes, cannot be proven. How-
ever, in both kinds of cases, the plaintiff is unable to prove that the de-
fendant was the cause-in-fact of the injury under traditional tort theory.
The question then arises that if an exception can be made for the inherent
uncertainty in the origin of causation, why not in its terminus?12 This
argument was adopted and applied by Judge Jenkins in Allen v. United
States.129
In Allen the court shifted the burden of proof of causation in the
124. Thode, Tort Analysis Duty-Risk vs. Proximate Cause and the Rational Allocation of Func-
tions Between Judge and Jury, 1977 UTAH L. REv. 1, 5-7.
125. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948). See also Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588,
607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980); Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944).
126. Thode, supra note 124, at 6.
127. Delgado, supra note 75, at 881-83. See Hall & Silbergeld, supra note 85, at 445.
128. Delgado, supra note 75, at 883.
129. 588 F. Supp. 247 (D. Utah 1984), rev'd, 816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987) (on grounds of
sovereign immunity), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 694 (1988).
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negligence action against the federal government brought by 1,192 plain-
tiffs who had resided in communities surrounding the Nevada Test
Site.130 The plaintiffs alleged that their exposure to radioactive fallout
from the open-air nuclear testing at the test site was the proximate cause
of their cancers."' After an exhaustive and cogent discussion of the in-
surmountable problem facing the radiation tort plaintiff in proving cau-
sation, 3 2 Judge Jenkins held that, in the interest of justice, the burden of
proof of causation was shifted to the federal government due to its negli-
gent conduct.133 Jenkins wrote:
Where a defendant who negligently creates a radiological hazard
which puts an identifiable population group at increased risk, and a
member of that group at risk develops a biological condition which is
consistent with having been caused by the hazard to which he has been
negligently subjected, such consistency having been demonstrated by
substantial, appropriate, persuasive and connecting factors, a fact
finder may reasonably conclude that the hazard caused the condition
absent persuasive proof to the contrary offered by the defendant.1 34
While the extension of the indeterminate defendant exception to in-
determinate plaintiffs appears logical and fair, it ignores the obvious fact
that the problem is with the traditional tort tests and proof of causation.
An extension of an exception to the rule palliates the problem; it does not
cure it.
Another argument against the solution of shifting the burden of
proof of causation is that it mingles cause-in-fact with negligence. The
goal should be to make cause-in-fact as neutral as possible, forcing the
limitation or extension of liability to be an explicit policy determination
under proximate cause. In this instance, cause-in-fact does not have to
be proved if breach of duty is proved. This ignores the fact that cause-in-
fact is an element to be proven by the preponderance of the evidence in
strict liability 35 and product liability136 suits as well. Unfortunately, the
reasoning employed in Summers v. Tice would not be as persuasive in
strict liability suits. Would this in effect produce two different kinds of
proof of causation: one for negligence and one for strict liability? The
.possible effect of shifting the burden of proof of causation emphasizes the
necessity of keeping cause-in-fact separate from negligent conduct.
130. Id. at 257.
131. Id. at 257-58.
132. Id. at 404-15.
133. Id. at 415.
134. Id.
135. W. KEETON, supra note 11, § 79, at 560.
136. W. KEETON, supra note 11, § 98, at 692.
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A better solution is to add an alternative test for cause-in-fact which
would address these concerns. In his article Concerning Cause and the
Law of Tort: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., Calabresi suggests the test of
"causal linkage" as a determination of cause-in-fact. 1'37 He suggests that
"[t]here is a causal link between an act or activity and an injury when we
conclude on the basis of the available evidence that the recurrence of that
act or activity will increase the chances that the injury will also oc-
cur."' 38 He further notes that the functions of tort law would lose little if
causal linkage were the only test of causation allowed, as long as policy
decisions to limit liability were explicitly left to proximate cause. 139
The "causal linkage" test would not only solve the problem of the
indeterminate defendant, but would solve the problem of the indetermi-
nate plaintiff. For example, in Summers v. Tice it would not be difficult
to show that the negligent firing of a shotgun by both defendants, if re-
peated in the future, will increase the likelihood of the kind of injury
which occurred. In the case of our indeterminate plaintiff, Dena Smith,
the "causal linkage" test is tailored for her probabilistic, epidemiological
evidence of causation."4 This test of causation should be adopted in or-
der to augment the particularistic "but-for" and "substantial factor"
tests of cause-in-fact and remedy their inadequacy in evaluating probabil-
istic proof of causation.' 4
C. Probability of Causation as Proof of "Causal Linkage"
The "causal linkage" test is an empirically based test that lends it-
self well to proof of cause-in-fact through radioepidemiological determi-
nation of cause.' 42 For example, under the "causal linkage" test Dena
Smith would have to prove that the use of uranium mill tailings as con-
struction material in her house increased the likelihood of lung cancer.
As mentioned above, the only proof available to Dena (as is typical of
radiation tort plaintiffs) is her exposure to radon and the epidemiological
evidence that inhalation of radon gas increases the risk of lung cancer.
137. Calabresi, supra note 13, at 71.
138. Calabresi, supra note 13, at 71
139. Calabresi, supra note 13, at 105-07. See also Brennan & Carter, supra note 110, at 52-53.
140. The relation of this theory of causation to scientific causation has been noted: "[The] ap-
peal to probability in solving causal problems could be justified by the growing importance of statisti-
cal laws in science and by the fact that in quantum theory it appears impossible in principle to
formulate them otherwise." H. HART & A. HONORE, supra note 111, at 417 (footnote omitted).
141. Brennan & Carter, supra note 110, at 52. "Causal linkage is a probabilistic theory of causa-
tion, while 'but for' causes are analogous to mechanistic corpuscularian causes." Id (footnote
omitted).
142. Brennan & Carter, supra note 110, at 52. See also Calabresi, supra note 13, at 71.
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To prove cause-in-fact under the "causal linkage" test, the plaintiff
would have to present the following evidence: (1) that the injury received
is of a type known to be caused by radiation; (2) the radiation dose; t43
and (3) the relevant risk coefficient from the NIH tables."4 From this
evidence, the calculated probability of causation 145 would provide the
proof of the "causal linkage" between Dena's exposure to radon and her
lung cancer.
The available 146 risk coefficients from the NIH tables for the calcu-
lation of probability of causation should also be adopted. The risk coeffi-
cients in the NIH tables would provide the court with the best scientific
estimate of risk'4 7 and a more simple and consistent method of calculat-
ing the probability of causation in radiation tort cases.148
143. Alpha-track detectors are used to measure the annual average radon concentration in an
enclosed structure. The dose to an individual residing in the structure would be dependent on the
amount of occupied time.
Proof of dose, in general, is not an easy task. Radiation workers would have the easiest task of
proving dose from the external exposure, as they wear film badges or pocket dosimeters to measure
their dose and records of their cumulative dose are kept by the employer. For a discussion of poten-
tial dose assessment problems for radiation workers, see Meinhold, The Impact ofthe Probability of
Causation on the Radiation Protection Program, 55 HEALTH PHY IcS 375-77 (1988).
Proof of dose becomes a problem when the unsuspecting plaintiff is not a radiation worker and
has been exposed through environmental vectors, such as air or water. In the Nevada test site case,
for example, elaborate radioecological modeling was required to attempt to reconstruct the dose the
surrounding communities received from the fallout.
144. NIH TABLES, supra note 28, at 126-62. The reliability of the NIH tables depends on up-to-
date review of new radioepidemiologieal data. The NIH tables are required to be updated "every
four years, or whenever [the Secretary of Health and Human Services] deems it necessary to insure
that they continue to represent the best available scientific data and expertise." Act of Jan. 4, 1983,
Pub. L. No. 97-414, § 7(b)(3), 96 Stat. 2059, 2060.
The importance of such a provision is evidenced by a recent reevaluation of the dose estimates
of atomic bomb survivors. Preston and Pierce, through their work with the Radiation Effects Re-
search Foundation in Hiroshima, Japan, have reassessed the risk estimates for leukemia and solid
tumor cancers as 75-85% higher than previously estimated in the BEIR III Report and the NIH
tables. Preston & Pierce, The Effect of Changes in Dosimetry on Cancer Mortality Risk Estimates in
the Atomic Bomb Survivors, 114 RADIATION RESEARCH 437-66 (1988).
145. PC = Dose x Risk Coefficient/(Dose x Risk Coefficient) + Bkg Cancer Incidence.
146. Several primary cancer sites and age groups have been excluded from the NIH tables due to
lack of sufficient data. Catlin, supra note 36, at 75. When risk coefficients are not available in the
NIH tables, the plaintiff could still calculate the probability of causation from available
radioepidemiological data.
147. Catlin, supra note 36, at 74. Jacobson, supra note 50, at 809. S 921, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.,
129 CONG. REc. S 3922. (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1983) (Questions and answers entered into the record at
the request of Sen. Hatch).
These tables and formulas will free the courts from dependence upon haphazardly
selected epidemiological 'experts'. Judges are not scientists, and it is unlikely that they
would become competent in radioepidemiology via the conflicting testimony in what is
essentially an adversary procedure or a tort case.... HHS's radioepidemiological tables
should represent a consensus among the best scientists in the field.
129 CONG. REc. S3922 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1983). Contra Jose, The Probability of Causation Ap-
proach, 55 HEALTH PHiYSICS 371-73 (1988).
148. Bond, supra note 29, at 67.
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D. The Argument for Proportional Liability in Radiation Tort
Litigation
The adoption of the "causal linkage" test in conjunction with epide-
miological proof of that causal linkage shifts the emphasis from whether
the defendant's conduct caused the plaintiff's injury to the likelihood or
probability that the defendant's conduct caused the plaintiff's injury. Be-
cause liability under traditional tort law mirrors the "either-or" proof of
cause-in-fact by awarding the plaintiff "all or nothing" of the proven
damages, a different method of imposing liability is needed for awards
based on proof of the probability of causation.149 The answer to this
concern is proportional liability based on the probability of causation
proved by the plaintiff.15 It is the probability that the plaintiff's cancer
was caused by the exposure to radiation that is proved, not that radiation
did or did not cause the cancer. It appears logical, therefore, that the
plaintiff should recover in proportion to the probability of causation.
Consequently, the plaintiff, upon proving a prima facie case, would be
awarded the proven damages multiplied by the probability of causation.
For example, if Dena Smith were successful in proving the other ele-
ments of her tort cause of action, she would recover twenty-five percent
of her total damages.
The equity of proportional liability in radiation tort cases is appar-
ent if one views the harm caused by the defendant as a harm to a popula-
tion of which the plaintiff is a member. This concept appears foreign in a
tort system traditionally concerned with compensation of the individual
plaintiff.1 "' A plaintiff must identify with a "subgroup of a larger popu-
lation" which has been exposed to radiation and has substantially the
same characteristics as the plaintiff in order to successfully implicate the
defendant as the cause-in-fact of the cancer.1 2 From an epidemiological
perspective, the characteristics of an individual can only be represented
by the "statistically average" person. 15' The plaintiff, therefore, assumes
the probability of causation estimate of the harm caused the "statistically
149. Comment, supra note 75, at 254.
150. Comment, supra note 75, at 254. Contra Note, supra note 10, at 859.
151. This comment does not address the question of whether radiation exposure suits should be
handled as class action suits rather than as private actions. For a complete discussion on the advan-
tages and disadvantages of "public law," see Rosenberg, supra note 92, at 859. See also Delgado,
supra note 75, at 881.
152. Bond, supra note 29, at 64. See also Jacobson, supra note 50, at 807.
153. Catlin, supra note 36, at 73.
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average" person only to the extent that the plaintiff epitomizes the "sta-
tistically average" person. 154 Though in reality, the radiation exposure
either did or did not cause the plaintiff's cancer, the cause can only be
expressed in terms of the causal association of excess cancer incidence in
an exposed population. The plaintiff, in essence, becomes a microcosm of
that population by assuming "gradations of cancer that can increase with
the amount of exposure."15
If recovery is viewed in light of this reliance upon population statis-
tics, it becomes apparent that recovery should be allocated to the exposed
population, not the individual. For example, assume that there are ten
plaintiffs exposed to the same dose of radiation who later develop cancer,
and the probability that the radiation exposure caused each plaintiff's
cancer is ten percent. In fact, only one plaintiff's cancer has been caused
by the radiation dose. Under proportional recovery, the defendant pays
ten percent recovery to each of the ten plaintiffs, thereby paying a total of
one one hundred percent recovery for the one plaintiff who was actually
harmed by the defendant."6
Under this system of proportional liability, the "rights" role of the
torts system to perform "corrective justice" that preserves the rights of
the plaintiff against the "wrongful infringement" of the defendant' 57 in-
terfaces with the utilitarian role of providing the "optimal deterrence" 58
of the tortious conduct. Proportional recovery based on the probability
of causation insures that all the plaintiffs potentially injured by the de-
fendant's conduct can recover some of their damages. 5 9 The population
as a whole is compensated and the defendant is held liable for the actual
harm caused: the excess cancers in the population. 16° Proportional lia-
bility thereby insures optimal deterrence because the cost to the defend-
ant is the redress of the actual harm caused to the population, though the
154. Catlin, supra note 36, at 73.
155. Bond, supra note 29, at 63.
156. In a private tort action, it is unusual to look at an individual plaintiff's harm and recovery
as based on a population. It appears that compensation of the plaintiff does not occur in this situa-
tion. Indeed, the one thing we know for certain is that the probability of causation does not reflect
the actual probability that each individual plaintiff developed cancer due to exposure to radiation.
What occurs on an individual basis is that nine plaintiffs receive a windfall often percent of damages
even though their cancers were not caused by the radiation exposure, and one plaintiff is undercom-
pensated ninety percent of damages because the cancer was in fact caused by the radiation exposure.
The alternative for the plaintiff, however, is no recovery under traditional tort theory. See Delgado,
supra note 75, at 892-93.
157. Rosenberg, supra note 92, at 859-60.
158. Rosenberg, supra note 92, at 862.
159. Delgado, supra note 75, at 893. See also Comment, supra note 75, at 256.
160. Delgado, supra note 75, at 893. See also Comment, supra note 75, at 258.
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actual victims are unidentifiable. 161
The importance of the redress of injury costs is underscored when
the defendant is a business (as is often the case) that conforms safety
investments to profit margins.162 This is particularly true when the de-
fendant's business involves radioactive materials. That radiation expo-
sure can cause cancer is not disputed.1 63 But if cost of the injuries is not
borne by the party who benefits from the use of radiation, there is no
economic incentive for that party to invest in safety. From the defend-
ant's point of view, no harm is done if it is not attributable to the
defendant.
The failure of causation in the traditional tort system to attribute the
risk of cancer to the sources of radiation which would otherwise be liable
has made investment in safety less economical and, therefore, more
lax."64 Recent reports by the Ohio environmental protection agency esti-
mate the release of 298,000 pounds of uranium wastes into the air, and
the deliberate dumping of 167,000 pounds of hazardous waste into a river
by National Lead of Ohio, the contractor at a uranium processing plant
in Fernald. 161 Uranium-238 has a half-life of 4.5 x 10' years. 166 The
effect of its dispersal will be felt for millions of years. 167 Though a class
action was filed against National Lead in 1985 by the Fernald area resi-
dents, the plaintiffs limited their prayer for damages to lowered property
values and emotional trauma, because they were "[a]l too aware that
radiation exposure is difficult to link conclusively with specific health
problems."' 161 One of the plaintiffs, who attributes the cancers of his two
sons, ages eight and two to the contamination of the air and soil in the
family's vegetable garden with uranium-235 from the Fernald plant,
painfully articulates the need for legal redress:
I would like to see, just like it was an individual, that they'd just admit
they screwed up, that they were willing to right their wrongs... There
is a lot of damage they can't undo. But if they deny responsibility, and
you have a Government that is not accountable to its citizens, then you
do not have a republic. 169
161. Rosenberg, supra note 92, at 866.
162. Rosenberg, supra note 92, at 855. See also Note, supra note 10, at 843 n.12.
163. See supra notes 22-65 and accompanying text.
164. Cramer, Leavitt & Nash, "They Lied to Us " TIME, Oct. 31, 1988, at 61-65.
165. Id. at 64.
166. UNSCEAR, supra note 7, at 13. Because it is not possible to predict when any given atom
will disintegrate, half-life is used to determine, on the average, the amount of time in which half of
the atoms of a nuclide will disintegrate. H. JOHNS & J. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 8, at 28.
167. UNSCEAR, supra note 7, at 13.
168. Cramer, Leavitt & Nash, supra note 164, at 64.
169. Cramer, Leavitt & Nash, supra note 164, at 65.
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V. CONCLUSION
Radiation by its very nature presents a risk of injury to society; it is
a known carcinogen. Several radioactive elements have such long half-
lives that their exposure period extends for many millions of years. The
gravity of the risk together with the increased probability of exposure due
to the long half-lives of many radioactive elements should enter into any
balancing equation concerning the costs and benefits of the use of radio-
active substances.
Because society relies primarily on the tort system to prevent injury-
generating activity and to compensate victims of such activity, the costs
of radiation use must be recognized and remedied by imposing liability.
The inaccessibility of a remedy in tort for the radiation tort plaintiff
shifts the balance away from investments in safety because no injury
costs are weighed.
Tort remedy often remains inaccessible to radiation tort plaintiffs
due to the outdated legal notions of causation. The rejection of probabil-
istic evidence of cancer causation in radiation torts due to its failure to
meet the requirements of legal cause-in-fact should result in the reevalua-
tion of legal cause. To remedy this deficiency, the legal concept of cause-
in-fact should be expanded to allow for probabilistic evidence that pro-
vides a "causal linkage" between the radiation exposure and the develop-
ment of cancer. The science of radioepidemiology can provide that
evidence through the determination of the probability of causation.
If the plaintiff succeeds in proving each element of the tort by a
preponderance of the evidence, the liability of the defendant should be
proportioned according to the probability of causation proved. In this
way, the injury costs resulting from the use of radiation will accurately
reflect the actual harm caused by the radiation. The cost component in
society's balancing test will then be accurately weighed in decisions con-
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